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Abstract 
We briefly review security of the second generation mobile 
phones and then discuss security architecture proposed for 
the third generation phones and the new security issues that 
will be of importance because of the combination of their 
advanced capabilities and limitations. 
1 Introduction 
Mobile phones are becoming an indispensable part of ev- 
eryday communication. They provide the flexibility that is 
needed by an increasing number of mobile work force, and 
equipped with a wide range of advanced functionalities, are 
predicted to overtake other forms of communication in near 
future. 
Third-generation (3G) mobile phones will have Internet 
connection of high data rate and promise seamless connec- 
tivity for a free roaming user. They will provide an ‘al- 
ways on’ Internet, and make a range of services, tradition- 
ally available on desktop computers, accessible to mobile 
users, irrespective of their location. Providing adequate se- 
curity for these phones and the services that they offer is a 
central concern for their acceptability and uptake. 
In this paper we first give a brief overview of security 
features of second generation (2G) mobile phones and then 
discuss security issues in 3G systems. 
2 Security in 2G Cellular systems 
Security in cellular networks can be seen from the view 
point of operators and customers. The main concern of the 
operator is correct billing and ensuring that services cannot 
be stolen. From customers’ view point, the requirements 
are (i) conjidentiality andprivacy of communication, (ii) au- 
thentication of information and (iii) correct billing. 
The two widely adopted mobile phone systems are GSM 
and CDMA (and also TDMA). 
GSM 
The aim of GSM has been to make the system as secure 
as the public switched telephone network. With this goal 
security mechanisms prevent unauthorised network access 
and impersonation of subscribers, and protect confidential- 
ity (preventing eavesdropping) and privacy (tracking of the 
user based on his/her phone signal) of the mobile users. In 
GSM system, a smart card will be the Subscriber Identity 
Module ( S f M )  that is used to identify the subscriber. GSM 
system uses this information and a challenge-response pro- 
tocol to authenticate the user, and an algorithm called A5 
to encrypt the communication. The system has databases 
that contain administrative information and the current lo- 
cation of e x h  active subscriber in the network. To prevent 
the user’s identity to be revealed, or his calls to be linked, 
the user will receive a different temporary identity by the 
system in each call. However the user’s identity informa- 
tion and location can always be obtained from the network 
operator. 
Cryptographic algorithms used in GSM were initially 
kept secret with the aim of providing higher security. How- 
ever they were gradually leaked or reverse engineered and 
subsequently shown to be insecure. This includes encryp- 
tion and authentication algorithms A3, A8, AY1 and AY2 
[ 6 4 ,  151. 
CDMA/TDhrlA 
In CDMA each user is assigned a unique code sequence 
that is used to encode his signal and decode the signal 
sent to him. The encoding process enlarges (spreads) the 
spectrum of the signal and is therefore known as spread- 
spectrum modulation (SS).  SS signals allow multiple access 
to the communication channel because the receiver can dis- 
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tinguish between the users who are assigned different codes. 
SS is particularly attractive because it provides higher 
security for air signals. It increases privacy because the 
data can only be recovered if the code is known to the re- 
ceiver. It also provides anti-jamming capability and low 
probability of interception (LPI)  because of wide spectrum 
and low power. 
Similar to GSM systems, CDMA systems provide user 
authentication and encryption of data, but use different 
cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Eavesdropping in 
CDMA and TDMA is a lesser threat, because firstly the 
eavesdropper must know the type of the system, TDMA 
or CDMA, and secondly, in digital systems the voice is 
vocoded and so the sound is not only digitised but also com- 
pressed. 
Service Theft 
The main concern of the cellular service providers is ser- 
vice theft. By far the cloning has been the most widely used 
attack against mobile phones. It is easy to clone an analog 
handset by simply using a scanner to learn the mobile phone 
numbers of the handsets in the area, and the electronic se- 
rial numbers that go with them, and program these numbers 
into another handset. 
A number of protcctive measures are used [ 161. This in- 
cludes laws against possession of scanning receivers, use of 
personal identification number (PIN) that must be entered 
before making a call, RFfirzgerprinfing to distinguish trans- 
mitters, challenge-response authentication, and finally cull 
counting where the handset and the network both keep track 
of the number of calls made by the handset and the num- 
ber is checked before a new call is accepted. Combination 
of the above technologies has effectively reduced cloning 
fraud. However with the introduction of services that allow 
purchase of the phones over the Internet, no real verification 
of ID is possible and subscriber fraud has emerged as a new 
type of fraud. One method of detecting fraud has been by 
storing calling patterns of users and raising an alarm when 
a new user has the calling pattern of a previously discon- 
nected user. Another kind of fraud is subsidy fraud where 
a phone whose cost is heavily subsided by a cellular carrier 
is activated on a different network. 
3 3G Systems - An Overview 
The 3G standardisation process started in 1995 when the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) began de- 
veloping IMT-2000 (International Mobile Telecommunica- 
tions for the year 2000). The main requirements of the 
IMT-2000 include support for a data rate of 144 kbls for 
users in  motor vehicles moving fast over large areas, 384 
kbls for pedestrians and 2.048 Mbls operation for office use. 
Moreover, i t  must provide voice quality comparable to that 
of the public switch telephone network (PSTN), more ef- 
ficient usage of bandwidth and provision of new services. 
3G networks will support both packet switched and circuit 
switched data services. 
The main two contenders for this standard that use 
terrestrial radio transmission technologies (RTTs) are the 
European-backed Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) and the US-backed cdma2000. Both sys- 
tems use Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technol- 
ogy for their radio interface. 
To prepare, approve and maintain globally applicable 
technical specifications and technical reports for third gen- 
eration mobile systems, the Third Generation Partnership 
Project (also known as 3GPP) was founded. The 3GPP 
Technical Specifications and Technical Reports will form 
the basis of standards of the partners [3] .  
Software 
Software technologies have been developed to effectively 
use the Internet access provided by 3G phones. 
An operating system for a mobile phone must provide 
fast access to applications. It must be modular so that var- 
ious modules can be added or removed depending on the 
needs of the users, and it must be able to run on low power 
and not to drain the battery. 
Currently, there are four Operating Systems that have 
been used widely in mobile devices: Palm OS, Windows 
CE, GeOS and Symbian EPOC. The OS provides protec- 
tion for the stored data, such as Address and Date Book in 
Palm OS. Applications may provide their own security. For 
example Microsoft Pocket Internet Explorer that is shipped 
with a Pocket PC operating system supports encryption via 
secure socket layer (SSL). 
There are several development systems for mobile de- 
vices. Palm OS applications are mainly developed using C 
language, although there are other development tools that 
can be used by non-programmers [SI. Windows CE ap- 
plications use Microsoft Software Development Kit (SDK). 
GeOS and Symbian EPOC have their own SDK. 
Wire!ess Application Protocol, WAP for short, is based on 
XML and HTTP and allows many lower network layer pro- 
tocols, such as SMS or CDMA (3G) to deliver their content. 
To make WAP to work with existing HTTP servers, a WAP 
gateway is required. The gateway translates the communi- 
cation between the server and the handset. That is, it con- 
verts the queries sent by the handset into appropriate HTTP 
format handled by the server, and in reverse translates the 
HTTP responses sent to the host into a compact binary for- 
mat understandable by the WAP client. The WAE (Wireless 
Application Environment) User Agent which resides on the 
WAP client uses WML (Wireless Markup Language) as the 
format to display the content. 
WAI” 
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4 Security in 3G Systems 
A 3G mobile phone resembles a desktop computer di- 
rectly connected to the Internet. In has capabilities of 
the desktop without any protection provided for a desktop 
through the LAN connection and the firewall systems that 
protect the LAN from outside world. The phone it is di- 
rectly connected to the Internet. 
Security becomes particularly important because data 
connection is always on and the phone can be subject to 
attack at any time. The risk of all time open connection is 
similar to attacks mounted on hosts connected to the Inter- 
net. An unprotected connection can be used by malicious 
hackers to access data stored on the host, and/or run mali- 
cios codes to use the storage or computing power of the host 
for a range of attacks and unauthorised usages. The dam-’ 
ages that can be caused by malicious codes, such as viruses 
and worms, become more pronounced because of the vast 
reach of the phone through the Internet and other wireless 
devices. 
One of the main challenges in securing the system is the 
physical, and hence computational, limitations of a hand- 
set that puts severe limits on the choice of security algo- 
rithms that can be used. Moreover many applications re- 
quire fast response time which puts yet another restriction 
on the kind of algorithm that can be used. On the other hand 
some services such as Internet banking or access to medical 
databases require a very high level of security. It is the com- 
bination of these factors, that makes provision of security a 
very challenging task. 
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) work- 
ing party on security has proposed a security architecture 
for 3G mobile phones [ 13. The security enhancement com- 
pared with 2G systems are introduced because of ( I )  com- 
bination of known attacks on cellular phones and those on 
hosts connected to the Internet, (2) increasingly sophisti- 
cated software and devices used by attackers and (3) lack of 
physical security in some network elements. The security 
architecture defines five feature groups where each group 
achieves certain security objectives. The attacks counter- 
acted in the proposed architecture include eavesdropping, 
impersonation of the user and the network, man-in-the- 
middle attack, and compromising authentication vector. In 
[ 2 ]  a range of attacks on the system is considered and the 
protection offered by the architecture is evaluated with the 
conclusion that with correct implementation and configura- 
tion of the proposed architecture the majority of the attacks 
can be prevented. Because of the reach and functionality of 
mobile phones, defining a clear security policy and control- 
ling access to resources is of the highest priority. Another 
important security risk to the phones is through the man- 
agement and control subsystem. 3G network elements must 
support remote management and communication with other 
systems such as billing system which would be ideal targets 
for attacking, the system. The nodes must be sufficiently 
protected anti detailed security log for after-the-fact investi- 
gation must be planned. Another major risk area is the inter 
network security where signalling systems with plain mes- 
sages for transfer of various kinds of information are used. 
Subverting these messages could result in complete collapse 
of the system and so control messages must be carefully se- 
cured. 
Authentication protocol proposed by 3GPP 
In 3GPP pro!posal, a new block cipher algorithm called Ka- 
sumi [ 101 is used. Kasumi is based on one of Matsui’s pro- 
posed algorit.hms, Misty, and has a 128 bit key. Misty has 
been a public algorithm that has withstood public scrutiny 
for some years. 
The basic authentication is performed by VLR (Visitor 
Location Register). The HLR (Home Location Register) is 
replaced by Home Environment (HE) and the SIM is called 
the UMTS SlM (USIM). As in GSM, the HE chooses a ran- 
dom challenge RAND and encrypt i t  with the U S I M  au- 
thentication key K to generate a response RES,  a confi- 
dentiality key C K ,  an integrity key I K ,  and an anonymity 
key AK.  The relation among these entities is 
There is also a sequence number SEQ that is known to 
the HE and the USIM. A MAC (Message Authentication 
Code) is computed on RAND and SEQ and the sequence 
number is masked by exclusive or-ing it  with the AK.  The 
challenge RAND, the expected response RES,  C K ,  I K  
and the masked sequence number are made up i n to  an au- 
therzticution vector AV which is sent from the HE to the 
VLR. Next, VLR sends ( R A N D ,  niasked SEQ, h/IAC) 
to the mobile station, and the mobile station computes the 
response and the keys, unmasks the SEQ, verifies the 
MAC, and if i t  is correct, returns the response RES to the 
VLR. 
Security in OS and WAP 
Capabilities such as viewing and playing multimedia in- 
formation in real-time, and/or performing complex trans- 
actions require high level of functionalities and support in 
the handset. Securing stored information requires access 
control mechanisms similar to what is offered in the operat- 
ing systems. Protections offered by Palm OS and Window 
CE and possible attacks on them are good examples of OS 
security in future 3G systems. 
WAP provides a layered architecture [9] with security 
layer called WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security). A 
WAP gatewxy uses WTLS to provide privacy, integrity and 
authentication between itself and a WAP browser client. 
WTLS provides the functionality of a strong Internet secu- 
rity standard over a wireless airlink and is based on TLS 1 .O 
(Transport Layer Security) which is in turn based on SSL 
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3.0. 
WAP gateway uses SSL to communicate securely with 
a Web server over the Internet on one side, and takes SSL- 
encrypted messages from Web and translates them for trans- 
mission over wireless using WTLS. It also converts mes- 
sages form the handset from WTLS to SSL. The WTLS 
protocol uses digital certificates to create a secure commu- 
nication pipe between a mobile phone and a WAP server. 
When Alice visits a site secured by a WTLS, her micro- 
browser sends a message to WAP server requesting a ses- 
sion. The WAP server sends its signed certificate, which is 
verifiable by Alice’s handset that has stored the public key 
of the certificate authority. Alice’s micro-browser generates 
a key which is encrypted by the server key and is sent to the 
server. Now micro-browser and the server can communi- 
cate encrypted messages using their shared key. 
In some applications that work across many wireless 
networks, content must remain encrypted from the time it 
leaves their application server until it arrives at the WAP 
handset. During translation between SSL and WTLS, mes- 
sages will become in plaintext form and can be exposed. 
Care must be taken in the design of translator to minimise 
the threat. WTLS goes beyond TLS 1.0 and offers such 
features as datagram support, dynamic key refreshing and 
optimised handshake [ 141. 
5 New Security Services and Risks 
3G phones will enable a range of new services and will 
rise many new security concerns. In the following we out- 
line a number of emerging risk areas of risk that either did 
not exist in 2G systems or the level of risk attached to them 
was an order of magnitude lower, because the 2G systems’ 
limited functionalities. 
User authentication is the first step in securing a mobile 
system and forms an integral part of security in all 2G sys- 
tems. In 3G systems, authentication requires a considerably 
higher level of assurance. This is because the phones sup- 
port many more complex and security critical applications 
such as Internet banking and access to databases of sensi- 
tive information (for example, medical databases). Biomet- 
ric technologies for user identification offer a high level of 
assurance and combined with other authentication methods 
such as PIN nutnber can guarantee the required security. 
In [ 181 a fingerprinting technology for verification of user 
identity is proposed. A sensor embedded in the surface of 
the cell phone captures an image of user’s fingerprint which 
is analysed and converted into a unique representation of the 
user’s fingerprint and stored in the phone and at a later stage 
use to identify the user. Combination of biometric methods 
and cryptographic user identification protocols could pro- 
vide a very high level of security. Again, limitations on 
computational power of the handset and delay introduced 
by the protocols must be carefully taken into account. 
In some high security applications user authentication 
must be end-to-end and so obtaining the agreement of the 
bank, the cellular provider and the handset on the same so- 
lution is required. This adds a new dimension to the secure 
implementation of the system. 
Securing Multimedia Services 
High bandwidth and fast data transfer enable 3G mobile 
phone to support multimedia information and so provide 
a wide range of services such as CD-quality music, video 
information and multi-user games. 
Processing multimedia information in real time and on 
limited bandwidth and highly constrained computational 
environment of a cell phone requires sophisticated cod- 
ing methods and powerful signal processing techniques. 
Adding security to the multimedia delivery systems, adds 
a new dimension to the complexity of the system and de- 
mands specially designed algorithms to provide adequate 
security and at the same time reasonable quality that is 
adjustable to the capabilities of the receiving device. In 
many applications, multimedia information are copyright 
protected. This means that the cell phone not only has to 
provide access control but also handle watermarking sys- 
tems that are proposed for the protection of copyright. A 
possible solution would be combining two or more func- 
tionalities in an attempt to reduce the computation cost. For 
example combining encryption and compression into onc 
system, instead of conventional method of encrypting com- 
pressed data and effectively applying the two processes con- 
secutively, could result in less overall computation. How- 
ever the combining operation must be carefully analysed so 
the performance (compression and security in this case) of 
the system is not drastically affected. We note that a require- 
ment of encryption algorithms is that they do not sprcad 
channel error. This is because multimedia information is 
firstly compressed and then encrypted and so if the encryp- 
tion algorithm spreads channel error the decompressed sig- 
nal will become completely unintelligible. 
Billing and Electronic Payment 
In 3G systems, one of the main challenges comes from the 
fact that it is not necessary to bill on a “per minute” basis. 
Packet switching means that users will be charged by the 
amount of data they send and receive and not by the time. 
Small prices add up to the phone bills. DoCoMo’s customer 
pay around 4.2 yen for a 250-character email message and 
14.7 yen for a news item. Companies providing the ser- 
vice pay 9 per cent of the revenue. Services such as above 
require very small amount of money to be paid electroni- 
cally. This requires electronic payment systems that allow 
a customer to freely move in the cyber world and purchase 
without the need for a prior account to be setup, while the 
cost of payment is only a small fraction of the actual pur- 
chase. The system must ensure that the risk to the merchant 
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remains ‘controlled’, that i t  highly unlikely to be above a 
specified limit. 
The phone will also be used for medium valued pur- 
chases from e-shops and also high valued Internet banking 
which may involve transfer of large sums of money. That is 
the full range of electronic payment mechanisms, including 
credit card, electronic cash and micro-payment, in a com- 
putationally restricted environment must be implemented. 
Again, the challenge in this case is the implementation of 
protocols which provide a high level of security in an envi- 
ronment with strict limitation on computational resources. 
Position Fixing and Big Brother 
Position information allows provision of useful services 
such us finding the location of the closest petrol station or 
restaurant, when a user visits an unknown place. Analysts 
believe that location fixing will open-up a multi billion- 
dollar market. A number of competing technologies have 
been proposed. Adding a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
chip and an antenna to the mobile phone will give accurate 
position information but it might not work if walls or car 
roof block direct communication. Server-aided GPS allows 
position fixing from anywhere, and also reduces the prob- 
lems of extra weight and power of the mobile by shifting 
most of the processing to the server. There are earthbound 
techniques that measure the distance between a mobile and 
3 base stations and use that to locate the mobile. 
The main concern with using position fixing is the po- 
tential to breach privacy. For example a car equipped with 
position fixing devices for protection against theft, can be 
potentially used in an invasive way to track people’s move- 
ment. In some systems, such as GPS, position can be found 
without any data recorded by the system while in others 
such as the earthbound systems users must trust the net- 
work operator not to track them. It is also worth noting 
that finding positions might be invaluable in tracing crimi- 
nals and so mechanisms that provide accurate position fix- 
ing in lawful situations are required. Cryptographic systems 
with revocable anonymity where identity information can 
be recoverable under specified conditions have been stud- 
ied in the context of electronic payment systems. Similar 
approaches can be adapted to location fixing to allow re- 
stricted anonymity while providing accountability for mo- 
bile users. 
All-time Connectivity (“always-on”) 
‘All-time connectivity’ and high functionality will in- 
evitably mean an increased risk of attack by mobile viruses 
and worms as well as malicious hackers. Malicious codes 
may be embedded in mail attachments, or be inadvertently 
downloaded with other data from a Web site. Even in the 
very short life of hand-held devices a number of viruses 
and worms for hand-held devices have already been writ- 
ten. Liberty Crack, first released on an Internet Relay Chat, 
was a Trojan Horse: i t  looked harmless but included mali- 
cious code [ 1 I]. Malicious code can not only wipe out data, 
applications and the operating system, but can also infect 
software to keep Liberty Crack from spreading to PCs, and 
from there to hand-held devices. 
Viruses infection can spread in many ways: for example 
through sharing a removable storage cards, infrared trans- 
mission, or through an email attachment. In June 2000 a 
hacker attacked DoCoMo mobile phones an email message 
containing a malicious script. The message claimed to be a 
test and asked a question and when the user answered ‘yes’ , 
a script Was run that dialled 110 which is the emergency ser- 
vice. In the same month Timofonica, a Visual Basic script 
worm attacked cellular phones in Spain. The worm spread 
via attachment to email messages sent to PCs. From a PC it 
sent an email that was receivable by a mobile device. When 
the victim opened the attachment it changed the devices reg- 
istry. In the: next boot of the system the worm erase the sys- 
tem information and leave the device unable to boot again. 
Protecting against Device Theft 
One of the main differences between a desktop computer 
and a 3G rnobile phone when providing protection for the 
system, is threat to physical security. A mobile phone can 
be easily stolen or even lost. This requires provisions to 
ensure the secrets and data stored in the device are protected 
and cannot be mis-used. 
In particular identity information stored in the device 
cannot allow an attacker to impersonate the owner and mis- 
use his privileges. Using multiple source identity verifica- 
tion metholds, that is, requiring more than one piece of ev- 
idence to prove identity could limit the attacker. That is 
the secrets stored in the mobile must be complemented with 
other secrei. information, such as fingerprint or PIN, to form 
the full identity. 
Today SIM identifies users to the phone system. In future 
i t  may act as a universal identification card. Loss of a phone 
must safely lock up the secrets stored in it. A solution is 
to store imlportant information on secure servers and make 
them accessible via WAP connection. The SIM will only 
store a personal identifier which is the private key of the 
user and is protected by the PIN. The card will shut itself 
if wrong numbers are keyed in three times. To switch it 
back on, the owner must take it to the police station. A 
private key will replace hard-to-remember logins passwords 
for websites as well as credit cards and pins. 
Important data in the mobile must be kept in encrypted 
forms however this will increase the access time of the 
owner and puts extra load on the processor. Protection of 
resident data must be provided without affecting perfor- 
mance of the mobile. 
Physical Liniitation and Implementing Security 
A successful security technology for mobile phones must 
satisfy the following requirements. 
Security processes must not, (i) delay to the call set-up 
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and subsequent communication, (ii) increase channel band- 
width, (iii) increase the effective error rate of the communi- 
cation, and (iv) add complexity in operating the device. 
Mobile devices have limited computational power and 
memory. Currently, mobile devices are equipped with 
around 2 - 32 MBytes RAM to store the data and proces- 
sors ranging from Motorolla EZ Dragonball with 16 MHz 
(for Palm OS) to Intel embedded 386 processor. This means 
that traditional cryptographic algorithms takes a long time 
which could not only add unacceptable delay to the com- 
munication but also drain the battery of the mobile. 
Public key crypto algorithm are the main cryptographic 
tool for unique identification of users and digitally signing 
electronic documents. Both of these operation are are in- 
dispensable in a building trust in transactions. The amount 
of computation required by the mostly widely adopted pub- 
lic key algorithm, that is RSA, immediately rules out rules 
its direct application. Server-aided versions of this algo- 
rithm [ 5 ]  distributes the computation between the mobile 
and the server such that the server will not learn the secret 
stored in the card and at the same time the more expensive 
part of the computation is performed by the server. Elliptic 
curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms provide high security 
with much shorter keys and have been proposed. ECC algo- 
rithms provide high security with much shorter keys com- 
pared to RSA. The level of security offered by 1,024 bits 
key RSA algorithm can be achieved with only 160 bits ECC 
algorithm [7]. This has enabled ECC to be implemented in 
low powered devices such as smart cards (71. 
Encrypting files and data for storage require a symmctric 
key algorithm. Algorithms such as Data Encryption Stan- 
dard [12] will be too costly in terms of the required com- 
putation and memory. Stream ciphers can be designed to 
have high security and operate at high speed. Most pro- 
posed encryption algorithms for mobile devices, including 
A5 algorithms, are stream cipher. 
S e c u r i q  b j  Obscur i t j  
It is strongly argued that hiding algorithms and methods 
would increase security of the systems. Experience has 
taught us differently. GSM and CDMA algorithms were 
all initially confidential and subject to export limitations. 
However as noted earlier, all the algorithms were eventu- 
ally leaked, or reverse-engineered, and then cryptanalysed. 
Another prominent example of the failure of ‘security by 
obscurity’ is compromise of the encryption system of DVD 
standard [ 171 and the watermarking system proposed for au- 
dio. Recent development of Advanced Encryption Standard 
[ 131 through a public process provides much higher assur- 
ance on the underlying algorithms used for providing secu- 
rity. 
6 Conclusion 
Securing 3G mobile phones is a daunting task. Combi- 
nation of advanced functionality and vast reach through the 
Internet and create an ideal medium for attackers to infiltrate 
computer systems and networks without being tracked. On 
the other hand, acceptability and take-up of the advanced 
services that could be supported by these phones will ulti- 
mately depends on providing assurance about the security. 
These factors make provision of security of highest priority 
in 3G systems. 
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